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Abstract
To facilitate electronic commerce in international trade,
paper-based documents in trade procedures have to be
replaced by electronic messages. This can be viewed as a
business process redesign problem. In this paper we
present a formal framework for representing so-called
Deontic Deep Structure Models (DDSM) for business
procedures. These models can be used to support the
electronification of such procedures. The framework is
based on a combination of deontic logic and action logic.
To illustrate its usefulness we show how the formal
framework can be applied to analyze some international
trade procedures in which obligations are transferred from
one agent to another agent
1. Introduction
In order to facilitate electronic commerce, i.e. doing
business via electronic networks like Internet or World
Wide Web, in international trade, paper-based documents
in trade procedures have to be replaced by electronic
messages. This can be viewed as a business process
redesign problem. The paper-based procedure has to be
redesigned for an electronic environment. In this paper we
propose a formal framework to support this redesign
process. In particular, we argue that deontic logic, i.e. the
logic about obligations, permissions and rights, is a
useful tool for this procedure redesign.
1.1 Transferable obligations in international
trade
In international trade procedures transfer of
obligations and rights is a crucial notion. An example of a
transfer of rights is the Bill of Lading. The bill of lading
is a document that has been used in international sea trade
for centuries. This document plays different roles in
international trade procedures: proof of shipment, claim
document and even collateral for the banks that finance the
trade. Therefore, it is complicated to redesign the paper-
based bill of lading into an electronic document, and much
research has already been done on the electronification of
the bill of lading.  An example of a typical situation to
use a bill of lading is the following. A seller in Rotterdam
has to deliver goods to a buyer in Hong Kong. For the
transport the seller hires a transport company to transport
the goods from Rotterdam to Hong Kong. The big
problem in international trade is time and distance. It can
take several weeks before the ship arrives in the port of
destination in Hong Kong. During this period the buyer
has not yet received his goods, and the seller has not yet
received payment for the goods. One way to solve this
payment delay for the seller is by an agreement, expressed
in a letter of credit, that the buyer will pay in advance
when the goods are shipped in the port of origin, provided
the seller can give sufficient evidence to the buyer that he
has indeed shipped the goods. The buyer demands this
evidence, because otherwise he runs the risk that he will
pre-pay goods that are never shipped. The bill of lading
can be used as evidence. When the seller ships the goods
in the port of Rotterdam onto the vessel of the transport
company, then the transport company will issue a bill of
lading which proves that he received goods from the seller.
If the seller gives this bill of lading to the buyer, then the
buyer will pay for the goods in advance. So, for the seller
the bill of lading is a proof of shipment. For the buyer
this document is a claim document. The transport
company will only give the goods in the port of
destination to the agent that presents the proper bill of
lading. Hence, by presenting the bill of lading the buyer
can exercise his right to obtain the goods he has paid for
in advance. What makes it more complicated is that bills
of lading are frequently sold to other agents. The buyer can
sell the bill of lading to other agents. For example, in the
oil trade it happens quite frequently that a shipment of oil
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is traded several times during the transport. Each time the
bill of lading is transferred from the old owner to the new
owner the right to claim the oil is also transferred from
the old owner to the new owner.
In this paper we present a first sketch of a formal
framework to represent and analyze the dynamics of
transferable obligations. This framework is a combination
of different modal logics, of which deontic logic is the
most prominent one. In this paper we do not introduce
new logics. Rather we show how a proper combination of
two existing logics can be used for the modeling and
analysis of international trade procedures. The framework
should provide concepts that are adequate to construct the,
what we will call, Deontic Deep Structure Model (DDSM)
behind the procedures. This deontic deep structure plays an
important role in the (re)design of procedures.
1.2 A redesign methodology based on deontic
deep structure models
In the case of (re)design of procedures it is essential to
understand the underlying functionality of the procedure.
For what purpose was the procedure introduced? Why were
certain documents introduced? And, more specifically for
redesign, is the procedure still needed, or can the
underlying functionality be implemented by a more
efficient procedure. This last question is in particular
interesting in the case of the 'electronification' of a
procedure in electronic commerce; i.e. adapting procedures
to make them applicable in electronic networks
environments. Currently, the usual redesign approach is
simply to replace paper-based documents one-to-one by
electronic data interchange (EDI) documents, but this
approach does not make the best use of the potential of
electronification (see e.g. [7]). In particular, electronifying
every document in a procedure does not address the issue
whether parts of or even the whole procedure is still
needed in an electronic environment. One could describe
the currently dominant approach to electronify documents
one-to-one into their electronic counterparts as a type of
superficial redesign. In contrast with a type of redesign,
which one could call deep redesign, that is based on first
modeling the underlying functionality of the whole
procedure.
What should such a model of the underlying
functionality look like? In many procedures documents
play a crucial role. For example, passport for
identification, import or export clearance documents, bills
of lading in international sea transport. The purpose of
most of these documents is fraud prevention or detection.
In general, one could say that fraud means that somebody
violated his obligation to do action p, while he pretends to
have done p. Fraud is easy, when it is hard for the victim
to detect it. For example, in the international trade
example discussed above the seller could deceive the buyer
by sending a forged bill of lading without shipping any
goods. In this case the seller violated his obligation to
ship the goods, while he pretended to have fulfilled his
obligation by sending the forged bill of lading. In order to
prevent this type of fraud, it is usually required that a
representative of the transport company signs the bill of
lading. Another fraud risk of the bill of lading is that its
uniqueness has to be secured. Since the buyer can use this
document to exercise his right to claim the goods, it is
essential that there are no copies of this document. Also
this fraud risk can be reduced by having a signature on the
document. In addition to these two functions there are yet
another dozen functions that the bill of lading must have
in order to prevent the different types of fraud risk that are
related to the underlying obligations and rights. In the
redesign process it is essential to preserve these functions
of the bill of lading. How do you secure, for example, the
uniqueness of bill of lading if it is replaced by an
electronic message that can be copied millions of time
without leaving a trace? This can be solved by adding an
electronic signature to the electronic bill of lading.
However, this electronic signature, based on public key
cryptography technology, is quite different from the
signature on a paper document. For example, the use of
electronic signatures requires the introduction of an extra
party on the electronic network, the so-called trusted third
parties, that act as notaries for the distribution of the
public keys. These fraud prevention and detection
functions of a document are best analyzed in relation to
the obligations and rights that they are supposed to secure.
Since obligations are essential for fraud analysis, it is an
obvious choice that the underlying functionality of
procedures should be analyzed in a deontic model. The
formal framework presented in this paper should provide
the logical concepts for this deontic deep structure model
of a procedure.
The ultimate objective of the research at Euridis is to
develop a computer-supported methodology for procedure
redesign that consists of the following three phases that
are represented in Figure 1. First, a deontic deep structure
model of the existing procedure is developed. Secondly, to
this model we apply a library of heuristics that can be
used to reduce the risk of fraud related to this specific
deontic deep structure model. These heuristics take as
input this deontic model, and they produce as output a
template for a procedure that include paper or EDI
documents which give optimal protection against
potential fraud. The third phase is that these templates are
graphically represented as Petri nets, which are generated
with the modeling tool Case/EDI that was developed at
Euridis (e.g. see [1]). The heuristics for an electronic
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environment might be different from a paper-based
environment. For example, implementing a signature on a
paper document is completely different from
implementing an electronic signature on an electronic
message. Another example is that in an appropriately
secured electronic environment the EDI version of a
passport might be no longer needed, because the
communication protocol is defined in such a way that
nobody can present himself on the network as another
person.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Procedure
Redesign
Deontic Deep
Structure
Model
Templates for
Paper-based
Environment
Heuristics
Library
Templates for
Electronic
Environment
Figure 1. Redesign methodology
Although there are currently techniques available to
implement modal logics (see e.g. [5]), it is not the
primary objective of our research to make the logics in the
framework itself computer executable. These logics are
used for representation rather than complex reasoning. In
the deontic deep structure models all the relevant aspects
of the underlying obligations and rights are supposed to be
explicitly represented, hence very little extra reasoning
about these deontic aspects is required. Also applying the
heuristics to the deontic deep structure models is more a
pattern recognition than a complex reasoning process.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2 and
3 we present several logics that are incorporated in the
formal framework in order to make it suitable for
representation of obligations in procedures. In section 4
we will informally discuss some examples. In section 5
we show how the formal framework is applied to provide
a deontic deep structure model of the examples. In section
6 we draw some conclusions and discuss some further
extensions of the framework.
2. The logic of directed obligations
In many business situations it is important to model
the obligations between different agents (e.g. in trade:
buyer, seller, transport company, stevedore, freight
forwarder, customs offices etc.). Most of these obligations
can be viewed as relations between two agents. For
example, the obligation to pay for delivered goods is
directed, so to say, from the buyer to the seller. In order to
model this aspect of obligations, we need a notion of
directed obligations in our framework. A suitable notion
of directed obligations is provided by the logic of
Herrestad and Krogh (Herrestad and Krogh, 1995). They
give the following example to illustrate the notion of
directed obligation. Suppose i and j have a contract which
states that: ‘i ought to pay j 1000 ECU’. This contract
implies a directed obligation from i to j that i brings
about that j receives 1000 ECU. They argue that this
contract implies a combination of a bearer-relativised
ought-to-do obligation on i to bring about that j receives
1000 ECU, and a counterparty-relativised ought-to-be
statement relative to j that i brings about that j receives
1000 ECU. Hence, they propose to define a directed
obligation as a conjunction of a bearer-relativised ought-
to-do obligation for i (iO) that i brings about that A and
an ought-to-be statement relativised to a counterparty j
(Oj) that i brings about that A:
iOj(iEA) =def iO(iEA) ∧ Oj(iEA)
In this definition iEA is an action operator which
denotes that agent i brings about state A. This definition
says that: “i is obliged towards j that i sees to it that A, if
and only if, it is obligatory for i that i sees to it that A,
and for j it ought-to-be that i brings about that A.” From
a legal point of view one could consider j in the operator
Oj as the claimant that can bring a violation of the
obligation to court. Each operator iO is regarded as a
relativised SDL operator; i.e. as having a normal modal
logic that satisfies the two axioms
[K] iO(A → B) → (iOA → iOB)
[D] iOA → ¬iO¬A.
The semantics are given by a model-structure: M = <
W, R, I, P >, where W is a set of worlds {w1,w2,w3,,..}.
P is a valuation function which assigns the values true or
false to a sentence at a world in W, I is a set of individuals
{i1, i2, .. ,in}, and R is a set of functions {R1, R2,...,Rn}
for each individual i1, i2, .. , in ∈ I. Each member of R
takes a member of W and returns a subset of W; i.e. Ri :
W → Pow(W). The intuition behind the functions in R is
that each individual has a function which returns the
deontically ideal worlds (for that individual) given a world.
The semantic notion of ideality is interpreted as a
preference for worlds where all obligations holding in w,
the world of evaluation, are fulfilled. For the bearer-
relativised obligation operator the following truth
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conditions suffice (||A|| denotes the set of worlds in which
the formula A is true): M, w |= iOA iff Ri(w) ⊆ ||A||,
which means that iOA is true at a world w in the model
M, if and only if, A is true at all worlds that are ideal
relative to w. Herrestad and Krogh assume that the
semantics of the Oj is similar to the one of the iO
operator. The logic of iE is supposed to be a minimal
modal logic of type ET.
3. The logic of (in)direct action
In many business situations an agent has the
obligation to do something, but he is delegating the
execution of this action to another agent. The boss in an
organization can delegate the tasks he is obliged to do to a
subordinate. A seller of goods can hire a transport
company to deliver the goods at the place of the buyer, if
it was stipulated in the contract that the seller was obliged
to do so. Delegating the execution of a task to another
agent is sometimes called indirect action.
In their logic Herrestad and Krogh use the action
operator iE, representing “i brings it about” or “i sees to it
that”. In their definition of this operator no distinction is
made between direct and indirect action. In other words, in
iEA it is not clear whether agent i himself is bringing
about A, or that another person is doing it for him. In
(Santos and Carmo, 1996) Santos and Carmo argue that it
is of vital importance for modeling in organizational
analysis to make this distinction. They even suggest to
introduce two different operators to represent this
distinction formally, namely iE and iG. They start with
the following axioms for the iE operator
[T] iEA → A
[C]  (iEA ∧ iEB) → iE(A ∧ B)
[RE] If |- A ↔ B then |- iEA ↔ iEB
The [T] schema captures the intuition that if agent i
brings it about that A, then A is indeed the case (iE is a
‘success’ operator). The [C] schema presupposes co-
temporality. The [RE] schema is closure under logical
equivalence. Santos and Carmo discuss which of the
following properties should be accepted:
[EEE] iEjEA → iEA
[EE¬E] iEjEA → ¬iEA
Accepting [EEE] would mean that an agent may “bring
about” indirectly (by using another agent). Accepting [EE
¬E] is a way of insisting that iEA means that agent i
must bring it about that A is the case by himself
(directly). The claim of Santos and Carmo is that we need
both notions. Therefor they introduce a new operator iG,
read as “agent i ensures that”, which denotes indirect
action. We accept for iE the additional axiom [EE¬E].
This means that we will read iEA as “agent i executes A
(with his own hands)”. The operator iG has the following
formal properties:
[T] iGA →A
[C] (iGA ∧ iGB) → iG(A ∧ B)
[RE] If |- A ↔ B then |- iGA ↔ iGB
[GGG] iGjGA → iGA
With schema [GGG] having the following reading:
“whenever agent i ensures that agent j ensures that A,
agent i also ensures that A”. With respect to the
relationships between the different agency operators (the
direct and indirect), we should accept (at least) the
following reasonable principles:
[EG] iEA → iGA
[GEGG] iGjEA→ iGjGA
[EEEG] iEjEA→ iEjGA
[EGE] iEA → iG iEA
The first principle is fundamental and states that
“whenever agent i brings it about that A, agent i also
ensures that A” (bringing about is a particular case of
ensuring). The other two state respectively that “whenever
i ensures that j brings it about A, i also ensures that j
ensures that A” and “whenever i brings it about that j
brings it about A, i also brings it about that j ensures A”.
The last one states that “whenever agent i brings it about
that A, i ensures that i brings it about A”.
The semantics of iG are given by a model structure: M
= <W, G, P, I >, where W is interpreted as a set of worlds
{ w1,w2,w3,,..}, P is a valuation function which assigns
the values true or false to a sentence at a world in W. I is
a set of individuals {i1, i2, .. ,in}, and G is a set of
functions {g1, g2,...,gn} for each individual i1, i2, .. , in ∈
I. Each member of G is a function with signature Pow(W)
→ Pow(W), and takes a subset of W representing some
state of affairs and returns a subset of this subset for
which i has ensured this state of affairs. So gi(X) means
the set of worlds where individual i ensures (the state of
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affairs described by) X. The truth at a world for
expressions of the form iGA is defined by:
M,w |= iGA iff  w  ∈ gi(||A||)
To validate the desired schemata for iG, the following
constraints on the model M are imposed: for all X and Y
subsets of W,
(tg) gi(X) ⊆ X
(cg) (gi(X) ∩ gi(Y)) ⊆ gi(X ∩Y)
 (ggg) gi(gj(X)) ⊆ gi(X)
In order to consider the relationships between the
operators iG and iE, the previous model should be extended
with functions (fi,...,fn) with signature Pow(W) →
Pow(W), where fi(X) means the set of worlds where agent
i executes X; define
M, w |= iEA iff w ∈ fi(||A||)
and impose the constraints to validate the schemata [T],
[C] and [EE¬E] for iE:
(te) fi(X) ⊆ X
(ce) (fi(X) ∩ fi(Y)) ⊆ fi(X ∩ Y)
 (ee¬e) fi(fj(X) ⊆ -fi(X)     (for i ≠j)
Here -fi(X) denotes the complement of fi(X) in W.
Finally, the semantic counterparts of [EG], [GEGG],
[EEEG] and [EGE] are obtained by imposing:
(eg) fi(X) ⊆ gi(X)
(gegg) gi(fi(X)) ⊆ gi(gj(X))
(eeeg) fi(fj(X)) ⊆ fi(gj(X))
(ege) fi(X) ⊆ gi(fi(X))
Santos and Carmo state that their operators iE and iG
are particularly useful to capture the notion of
responsibility in an organization. These operators are also
useful for modeling certain aspects of obligations in inter-
organizational situations. The formal framework that we
discussed in the introduction is based on the combination
of the two logics from Herrestad and Krogh, and Santos
and Carmo. The way we combine these two logics is that
within the logic of Herrestad and Krogh we replace the
semantics of their operator iE by the semantics of the
operators iE and iG of Santos and Carmo. This
combination does not create technical problems, because
both iE and iG have a minimal modal ET type of logic,
which was the only requirement by the logic of Herrestad
and Krogh. The logic of Herrestad and Krogh is very
suitable to model the directedness aspects of obligations,
but their notion of 'bringing about' is a bit restrictive, in
particular if we want to model certain aspects of the
transferability of obligations. The advantage of the logic
of Santos and Carmo is that their logic provides a very
subtle formal framework for the representation of indirect
action. This notion of indirect action plays an important
role in the modeling of transferable obligations in which
an agents fulfills his obligation by having another agent
that executes the fulfilling action for him.
4. Some examples from international
trade
In this section we informally discuss some examples of
which the deontic deep structure models will be given in
the next section.
Example 1: Transport Scenario
Consider a simple trade transaction between a buyer
(agent B) and a seller (agent S). In the initial state none of
the agents has an obligation towards each other. The first
step in the contract negotiation process is that both agents
agree to the terms of a purchase order. This agreement
creates an obligation for the seller to deliver certain goods
and in return it creates an obligation for the buyer to pay
for the goods. The resulting situation is shown in state 1
of Figure 2. The seller can either deliver the goods
himself (direct action) or hire somebody to do it for him
(indirect action). Let us assume S does it the indirect
way, then the second state is that the seller makes a
contract with a transport company T that T will deliver
the goods to the buyer after the seller has paid the
transportation costs. We also assume in this example that
it is stipulated in the contract that T is not allowed to
subcontract this transport. (Such a condition is sometimes
made if the transport company is chosen for his specific
skill in transporting certain type of goods, e.g. the
personal grand piano of Horowitz.) Hence, the transport is
a direct action for the transport company. An interesting
aspect of this example is that in spite of the fact that the
transport company has the obligation to transport the
goods to the buyer, this obligation is not towards the
buyer, but only towards the seller. In case of non-delivery
of the goods the buyer will make a claim against the
seller, and not against the transport company. Of course, if
the seller is sued by the buyer, then the seller in his turn
will make a claim against the transport company for non-
delivery, but that is another matter. We will see that this
aspect is reflected in the deontic deep structure model.
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Agent S
Role: Seller
Obligation to deliver goods
Obligation to pay for goods
Agent B
Role:  Buyer
Agent S
Role: Seller
Obligation to deliver goods
Obligation to pay for goods
Agent B
Role:  Buyer
Obligation to
transport goods
Obligation
to pay for
transport
Agent T
Role:Transporter
Figure 2. Transport scenario
Example 2: Transfer of Bill of Lading
The holder of a Bill of Lading (BoL) can exercise his
right to claim the goods from the transport company.
Reciprocally, the transport company has an obligation to
deliver the goods to the holder of the bill of lading. In the
initial state 1 in Figure 3 the buyer B, that pre-paid the
goods, holds the bill of lading. Now we assume in state 2
that B sells the goods to another agent, the new buyer N.
This includes the obligation that B gives the bill of
lading to N, and in return N is obliged to pay for the
goods. Because the holder of the bill of lading changes
from agent B to agent N, the obligation for the transport
company to deliver the goods also changes. This is what
we call a transfer of rights. The right of agent B is
transferred to agent N.
Agent B
Role: Buyer
Obligation to deliver goods
1
2
Agent T
Role: Transporter 
Obligation
to give BoL
Obligation to give BoL
Agent N
Role: New-Buyer
Obligation
to give BoL
Obligation to 
deliver goods
Obligation
to pay for
goods
Agent B
Role: Buyer
Agent T
Role: Transporter 
Figure 3. Transfer of bill of lading
5. Deontic deep structure models for the
examples
In this section we illustrate how a deontic deep
structure model for each of the examples from the
previous section is represented in the formal framework.
The deontic deep structure model for Example 1 shows
that we have to formally distinguish between direct and
indirect agency, i.e. to distinguish between the iG and iE
operators.
Figure 4 is the deontic deep structure model for
Example 1. In the initial state none of the agents has an
obligation. The contract 1 about sale of goods between
seller S and buyer B yields the transition from state 1 to
state 2. The symbol D represents the delivery action and
M represents the payment action. In state 2 we see that
both agent S and agent B have an obligation. The contract
2 between agent S and agent T concerning the delivery
yields the next transition. In state 3 the seller S and the
transport company T have a new obligation because of
contract 2. The transfer of agency of the delivery of the
goods is reflected by the introduction of the new
obligation tOs(tED) in state 3. The delivery D is a direct
action for T (as stipulated in contract 2), and an indirect
action for S, which is represented by the obligation
sOb(sGD). The transfer of agency from agent S to agent T
causes new reciprocal obligations, none of the previous
obligations have disappeared. Hence, this example shows
that agency transfer does not release the bearer of his
responsibility to fulfill his initial obligation to deliver the
goods. In particular, the agent S is still liable for non-
delivery of the goods by agent T. If T does not deliver the
goods, then agent B makes the damage claim related to
this non-delivery against agent S, not against agent T.
This is reflected by the fact that in the obligation
sOb(sGD) agent B can still make a claim against agent S.
Of course, in case of such a claim from B against S, the
latter agent will make a claim against agent T, but these
are two different claims. As we explained in section 1 the
operator Oj represents who can claim in the case of
violation of the obligation. Therefore, we consider that in
this example sOb(sGD) is still an obligation that has to
be fulfilled by S, hence S only transferred his agency of
the delivery of the goods, not his liability. The fact that,
in case of a non-delivery claim by B, S can make a claim
against T, is reflected in the obligation tOs(tGD), where S
is the claimant with respect to T if there is non-delivery of
goods.
: :
:
Contract 1 Contract 1+2
Agent S:
empty
Agent B:
empty
Agent T:
empty
Agent S:
sOb(sGD)
Agent B:
bOs(bGM)
Agent T:
empty
Agent S:
sOb(sGD)
sOt(sGM)
Agent B:
bOs(bGM)
Agent T:
tOs(tED)
Figure 4. Deontic deep structure model for
trade scenario
In Figure 5 the deontic deep structure for the Bill of
Lading example is shown. Let B denote the giving of the
bill of lading, D delivery of goods and M giving money.
In state 1 of Figure 5 the transport company T has an
obligation to deliver the goods to the buyer B, who holds
the bill of lading, because he pre-paid the goods.
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Contract 1
Agent B:
bOt(bGB)
Agent T:
tOb(tGD)
nOb(nGM)
nOt(nGB)
Agent N:
Agent  B:
bOn(bGB)
tOn(tGD)
Agent T:
Figure 5. Deontic deep structure model for
bill of lading transfer
The buyer is obliged to give the bill of lading to the
transport company. Subsequently, in state 2 the buyer
sells the goods by contract 1 to the new buyer N, which
includes that the buyer is obliged to give the bill of lading
to the new buyer. In return the new buyer is obliged to
pay for the goods. Hence, the right to claim the goods is
transferred from agent B to agent N. This is represented in
state 2 of the Deontic Deep Structure Model. The
transport company’s obligation has changed from
tOb(tGD) to tOn(tGD). So, the counterparty of the
transport company’s obligation has changed from agent B
to agent N. In addition to this transfer of rights two new
obligations are created; namely bOn(bGB) and nOb(nGM).
The first represents that agent B has to transfer the bill of
lading to agent N. The latter represents that agent N has to
pay money to agent B.
6. Conclusions and further research
In this paper we presented a first sketch of a formal
framework for representing deontic deep structure models
for trade procedures. This framework is based on a proper
combination of the deontic logic of Herrestad and Krogh
and the action logic of Santos and Carmo. We illustrated
with two examples how the formal framework can be
applied to analyze some international trade procedures in
which obligations are transferred from one agent to
another agent. In future research we plan to extend the
framework in the following ways..
In this paper the state transitions in the deontic deep
structure models are described informally. From a formal
point of view these state transitions can be analyzed as
actions that are brought about by illocutionary acts such
as committing oneself to an agreement by signing a
contract. We plan to investigate to what extent it is
possible to represent this dynamic behaviour of
transferable obligations in the illocutionary deontic logic
of [2] that is based on dynamic logic.
Another issue is the dependency between obligations
within a state of the deontic deep structure model. For
example, the obligation of the seller to deliver goods
precedes the obligation of the buyer to pay for them. As
we discussed in the introduction this dependency becomes
more complicated in international trade situations. The
buyer in Hong Kong is obliged to pay for the goods when
the seller has shipped them in Rotterdam. But how can the
buyer be sure that the seller did what he promised to do,
namely shipping the goods? One solution is that the seller
sends the buyer a bill of lading, i.e. a document that is
sufficient evidence for the buyer to believe that the seller
fulfilled his obligation. But this implies that the
fulfilment of the payment obligation is conditional on the
belief that the buyer has about the seller. To model this
aspect of the dependency we should include in our
framework also epistemic logic, the logic of knowledge
and belief (for a survey see [4]). Moreover, belief might be
changed due to new information. The buyer might retract
his belief that the seller shipped the goods if he gets new
information that indicates that the bill of lading was
forged. Retracting a belief, and also retracting the results
of actions that were caused by this belief (e.g. the pre-
payment of the goods), is a typical example of defeasible
or non-monotonic reasoning. To model this kind of
processes we also have to include non-monotonic logic in
our framework.
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